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POLITICAL UNION WITHOUT SOCIAL
REVOLUTION: VINCENZO GIOBERTI’S
PRIMATO
BRUCE HADDOCK
University of Wales, Swansea
abstract. Vincenzo Gioberti ’s Del primato morale e civile degli italiani () has been
acknowledged as a major influence on moderate liberal thinking in the Risorgimento. Yet historians
and political theorists have tended to dismiss the text as ponderous, unreadable or worse. The concern
of this paper is to present what was once seen as a canonical text in terms that might make its initial
appeal intelligible. Gioberti’s text is set in the context of theological reappraisals within the Catholic
tradition sparked by the rise of the national idea. The Primato managed to bring together currents of
thought which are often regarded as antithetical. Catholic universalism was used to buttress and
legitimize a specific view of the Italian nation. Gioberti’s synthesis was to have a lasting impact on
Italian liberalism, fostering a regard for established traditions rather than abstract rights. It also
served to isolate revolutionaries and reactionaries in a dramatic and decisive decade for political debate
in Italy.
I
Vincenzo Gioberti’s Del primato morale e civile degli italiani, published in two
volumes in Brussels in 1843, enjoys the dubious distinction of instant acclaim
from contemporaries but ultimate neglect by historians of ideas and political
theorists." Historians have continued to acknowledge the ‘astonishing success ’
the text enjoyed, constituting as it did a focal point in the emergence of both
moderate nationalist and neo-Guelph positions in the heady atmosphere of the
1840s.# Yet the text itself is variously described as ‘pedestrian’, ‘verbose’,
‘ turgid’, and even ‘silly ’.$ Nor has Gioberti’s text fared much better in the
recent revival of interest in federal theory in nineteenth-century Italy. His
federalism is dismissed as an ‘elegant expedient devised to resolve the grave
problem of the co-existence of the papacy and the emerging nation state in
Italy’.% And the attempt to elaborate an argument which could reconcile the
" Vincenzo Gioberti, Del primato morale e civile degli italiani (2 vols., Brussels, 1843) ; reference in
what follows is to the second edition (2 vols., Capolago, 1844).
# Christopher Duggan, A concise history of Italy (Cambridge, 1994), p. 7.
$ Ibid., pp. 7, 112 ; Stuart Woolf, A history of Italy, –: the social constraints of political change
(London, 1979), p. 338 ; Derek Beales, The risorgimento and the unification of Italy (London, 1981),
p. 58. The usual response, recently endorsed by Alfonso Scirocco, is simply to report that the book
‘was read avidly, reviewed and discussed’, despite being ‘weighed down by occasionally annoying
erudition’. See Alfonso Scirocco, L’Italia del risorgimento (Bologna, 1990), p. 224.
% Gianfranco Miglio, cited in Gianfranco Morra, Breve storia del pensiero federalista (Milan, 1993),
p. 56.
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diverse views of nationalists, monarchists, and the church is described as a
‘colossal equivocation’ that was exposed in the neo-Guelph position as the
1848 revolutions unfolded, revealing Gioberti’s much-vaunted ‘realism’ as
anything but realistic.&
It is clearly the case that Gioberti’s new readers are likely to come to the text
with some trepidation. It may well be that a complete rehabilitation of the text
is beyond the interpretative ingenuity of any commentator. From an historical
point of view, however, it is important that what was once seen as a canonical
text should be presented in terms that might (at least) make its initial appeal
intelligible. In what follows I hope to make a case for a positive reading of a text
which must clearly be approached from a number of different perspectives. In
the process, light should be shed on the synthesis of Catholic doctrine and
historical theorizing which was to continue to be a distinctive feature of Italian
liberalism throughout the nineteenth century.'
The immediate political context of the Primato is relatively straightforward.
The subversive activities of Mazzini’s La Giovine Italia movement and other
sects had given increasing cause for concern to the authorities in various parts
of Italy throughout the 1830s. What we begin to see in the 1840s, however, is
a hardening of view in moderate circles. Enlightened intellectuals and liberal
aristocrats, sympathetic to the cause of reform, had begun to question the
wisdom of Mazzini’s insurrectionary strategy. Problems were perceived on two
fronts. On the one hand, the despatch of small groups of insurgents to
politically sensitive or vulnerable areas had so far proved to be ineffective. On
the other hand, the sorts of doctrines preached by the Mazzinians gave no
guarantee that concrete social, economic, and constitutional reforms would
necessarily follow in the wake of their triumph. Reliance on the untrammelled
will of the people in Mazzini’s programme seemed to many moderates to be
both naive and dangerous.( The political lessons of 1793 were still uppermost
in their minds. The risk of a repetition of the reign of terror was simply not
worth running, no matter how worthy the cause. And, in any case, the prospect
of a political upheaval involving far-reaching social and economic changes
would almost certainly precipitate a fierce and co-ordinated reaction.
An alternative strategy began to emerge in the 1840s. Instead of looking to
a movement motivated by pressure from below, a group of thinkers began to see
& Zeffiro Ciuffoletti, Federalismo e regionalismo : da Cattaneo alla lega (Bari, 1994), p. 31. For
Gioberti’s place in the federalist debate in the Risorgimento see Franco della Peruta, ‘La
federazione nel dibattito politico risorgimentale : 1814–1847 ’, in Ettore A. Albertoni and Massimo
Ganci, eds., Federalismo, regionalismo, autonomismo: esperienze e proposte a confronto (2 vols., Palermo,
1989), i, pp. 55–79.
' See Gabriele de Rosa, Il movimento cattolico in Italia: dalla restaurazione all’eta[ giolittiana (Bari,
1988), pp. 17–44 ; Giovanni Spadolini, L’opposizione cattolica (Milan, 1994), pp. 3–77 ; Guido de
Ruggiero, The history of European liberalism, trans. R. G. Collingwood (Boston, 1959), pp. 275–343 ;
Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and modern society: an historical argument (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 105–56 ;
and Rosario Romeo, Il giudizio storico sul risorgimento (Palermo, 1987).
( The tone, in particular, of Mazzini’s ‘Istruzione generale per gli affratellati nella Giovine Italia ’
was viewed with alarm. See Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Giuseppe Mazzini, ed. L. Rava et al. (98
vols., Imola, 1906–40), ii, pp. 45–56.
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more fruitful possibilities for political change in the conversion of one or more
of the established ruling houses to the cause of reform. It would be misleading
to see this group as a self-conscious school or party in the early 1840s. By the
later 1850s, however, they would begin to dominate the national movement, at
least in the north. As a group, they were deeply suspicious of populism in all its
forms. Their interest in political reform was tempered always by a concern to
maintain the social status quo. In the political sphere, too, their ambitions were
strictly limited, extending (in most cases) no further than a modest con-
stitutionalism. Yet even so moderate a stance had been interpreted as a
revolutionary threat in the recent past. What made this group different was
their links with the liberal aristocracy, particularly in Piedmont. They could
wield influence without having to have recourse to subversive measures.
Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–52) was perhaps the most influential of the 1840s
moderates, though his links with the church made him a far from obvious
political leader. A leading liberal Catholic, his tortuous career had involved
him in uneasy relations with both ecclesiastical and political authorities.
Though ordained in 1825, his views were far from orthodox. In his youth,
under the influence of Rousseau and Alfieri, he had adopted a fiercely anti-
monarchical position. His rejection of the identification of throne and altar –
the centrepiece of restoration ideology – made him an object of suspicion in
high circles. Despite appointments to the chair of theology at the University of
Turin and as court chaplain in 1831, he remained under a cloud. The Jesuits,
in particular, against whom Gioberti would be embattled throughout his
career, were openly critical of both his theology and politics. Gioberti felt
obliged to resign his position at court. But he could not avoid further
embroilment. In 1833 he was accused of being a member of a secret political
society and of circulating copies of La Giovine Italia. Brief imprisonment was
followed by a long period of self-imposed exile which ended only with the
outbreak of revolutionary disturbances in 1848.
Gioberti’s position would shift markedly before he became the standard-
bearer of the moderates in the 1840s.) In the early 1830s, however, he was close
enough to Mazzini to lead people to suspect (wrongly) that he had actually
been a member of La Giovine Italia. An open letter of 1834 addressed to the
directorate of La Giovine Italia endorsed not only the political thrust but also the
evangelical tone of the movement. Gioberti found no problem with the
pantheism which has always disturbed Mazzini’s orthodox Catholic followers.*
He could also accept Mazzini’s historicist treatment of Christianity. The moral
rather than political emphasis of the early Christian message is explained in
terms of the needs of the times, with awareness of the equality of men before
God serving as a necessary premise for the later establishment of civic
equality."! Nor does he baulk at the prospect of a realization of the ‘reign of
God on earth’, inaugurated not through a second coming but by means of the
) See A. Omodeo, Vincenzo Gioberti e la sua evoluzione politica (Turin, 1941).
* See Vincenzo Gioberti, ‘Ai compilatori della Giovine Italia ’, in his Pagine scelte : edite ed inedite,
ed. Pier Angelo Menzio (Turin, 1922), p. 73. "! See ibid., p. 75.
708 bruce haddock
natural evolution of peoples, coming to live by God’s law and embracing the
implied principles of human association."" What is perhaps even more
surprising in Gioberti’s specific position is his scathing dismissal of Pope
Gregory XVI as a ‘vile oppressor of peoples ’, sanctifying ‘tyranny as a law’,
imposing ‘slavery as a duty’, condemning ‘ liberty as a crime’."#
Both the tone and content of the letter will come as a surprise to readers
familiar with the more conciliatory and prudent style of the Primato. But certain
basic commitments straddle both phases of Gioberti’s thought. Most important
of all was his contention that civilization could not but be built around religion.
While in some formulations such a claim might have amounted to little more
than a variation on the classic ‘ throne and altar ’ theme, the clear implication
of Gioberti’s argument was that the church itself should adapt to the spirit of
the times. The doctrine of progress had become an article of civic faith in the
nineteenth century; the church should embrace that faith and strive to make
its own teaching a necessary point of reference for the political, social, and
moral questions of the day. Gioberti was clearly expecting a good deal from the
church. At times he sounds as if he would be content to see religion serve as a
means towards secular goals, a position which the Jesuits had always resolutely
opposed. What is certain is that adaptation on the scale Gioberti demanded
would not be forthcoming during the pontificate of Gregory XVI."$
In the event, Gioberti would accommodate much of the church’s traditional
baggage long before the leaders of the church showed any real interest in
reform or renewal. The transformation of his own views was prompted in the
first instance by recognition of the futility of the Mazzinian insurrectionary
strategy. The fiasco of the 1834 Savoy expedition, in particular, illustrated just
how utopian Mazzini’s assumptions had been. Ordinary people had little
understanding of or interest in the arcane complexities of revolutionary
intrigue. They could neither respond to nor initiate policy. And yet, as Mazzini
himself recognized, without a groundswell of popular support, the efforts of
revolutionary bands would be doomed to failure."%
If popular revolution could be discounted in the circumstances of the 1830s,
"" See ibid., pp. 76, 84. "# Ibid., p. 82.
"$ Gioberti, of course, was not alone in his defence of a liberal Catholicism. Antonio Rosmini was
similarly engaged in the fraught business of reconciling the universalist principles of the church
with the contingent matter of the national question. No serious theologian could endorse the
nationalist positionwithout somemodification.The national debate in theRisorgimento essentially
invited a reappraisal of accepted notions of the relation between the spiritual and secular spheres.
Rosmini, like Gioberti, found himself responding to arguments which traditional theologians
might have preferred to ignore. In the political sphere, Rosmini elaborated a Catholic response to
Hegel, focusing in particular on a theory of the state which would secure a universal spiritual role
for the church. See Antonio Rosmini, La costituzione secondo la giustizia sociale con un appendice sull ’unita[
d ’Italia (Milan, 1848) ; and Antonio Rosmini, Filosofia della politica (Milan, 1837). Rosmini was
also involved in tortuous negotiations for an Italian confederacy with the pope as honorary
spiritual head. See Mario d’Addio, ‘Rosmini e la confederazione italiana’, Il politico, 69 (1994),
pp. 189–231. For Gioberti’s response to Rosmini’s initiative see M. Menghini, Vincenzo Gioberti
e la societa[ per la confederazione italiana (Rome, 1933).
"% See Giuseppe Mazzini, ‘Manifesto della Giovine Italia ’, in Edizione nazionale, ii, pp. 75–82.
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what alternative strategies offered tangibly better prospects? Gioberti was
adamant that nothing would be achieved unless the established configuration
of political powers in Italy were taken into account. And, despite his early
republicanism and life-long contempt for the ethos of aristocracy and court,
this could only mean that the national movement should seek a tactical
rapprochement with the princes."& In itself, this was little more than the statement
of a problem. The divisions between the various Italian states had, after all,
enabled foreign powers to exploit Italy for their own ends. Entrenched
differences of interest and tradition would only be set aside if an alternative
focus of allegiance could be devised. Italy as a symbol would clearly not suffice
if in practice the separate states had to accept the dominance of one among
them. What Gioberti sought was a genuinely Italian identity which trans-
cended political divisions. He was to seek it in the church, at the time identified
with the most obscurantist and arbitrary of the Italian states.
At the tactical level, Gioberti’s break with Mazzini looks decisive. But
profound differences of principle had also emerged. Gioberti, for example, was
anxious to distance himself from Lamennais, whom Mazzini continued to
regard as something of a mentor. In a letter of 20 December 1840 sent to the
Gazette de France, Gioberti repudiated both republicanism and the idea of
political equality, arguing that the fortunes of liberty and monarchy in Italy
were inseparable. Not only did he deny the validity of Lamennais’s identi-
fication of the emancipation of the people with the emancipation of the church
from the state but he specifically linked the church as an institution with the
Italian national cause."'
More significant, perhaps, is the theological gulf which now separated
Gioberti from Mazzini. Gioberti rejected the evolutionary theory of knowledge
which underpinned Mazzini’s conception of progress. He now regarded the
revealed wisdom of the Catholic tradition as an indispensable foundation for
any understanding of the civil and natural worlds. Without an objective basis,
knowledge would be reduced to psychological conviction. Indeed Gioberti
specifically linked Descartes and Luther as the ‘ twin monsters of a false
theology and a mendacious philosophy’, opening the way to a riot of subjective
interpretations in both religion and philosophy."( Gioberti, instead, insisted
that human knowledge had necessarily to be seen as an intuition of an external
world; but, further, that the idea of an external world was itself inconceivable
without recourse to a supernatural sphere.") God served as a guarantor of the
idea of reality, enabling human knowledge to be conceived as an attempt to
grasp something concrete rather than simply as an interpretative portrayal of
one of a myriad of possible worlds. In the political sphere, this meant that
sensible discussion had necessarily to begin with the configuration of traditions
"& See Woolf, A history of Italy, –, pp. 341–2.
"' See Pier Angelo Menzio’s introduction to Gioberti, Pagine scelte, p. xxiv.
"( Vincenzo Gioberti, Introduzione allo studio della filosofia, ed. G. Calo' (Milan, 1939), ii, p. 85.
") See Vincenzo Gioberti, Teorica del sovranaturale o sia discorso sulle convenienze della religione rivelata
con la mente umana e col progresso civile delle nazioni, ed. A. Cortese (Padova, 1970), ii, pp. 3–10.
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and institutions that had developed historically, rather than with a utopian
ideal conjured from philosophical imagination.
Gioberti was careful not to identify God with his creation. He avoided the
pantheism of his earlier Mazzinian phase by means of a distinction between
God as the absolute presupposition of an intelligible world and the actual world
as the contingent product of God’s omnipotence. Thus while it might be the
case that human beings could not make sense of the world without invoking
God, it did not follow that the world should be identified with God
ontologically."*
It cannot be said that Gioberti’s distinction had quite dispelled the suspicions
of his orthodox critics. He had sought to elaborate a specifically Catholic
philosophy based upon the idea of creation. But he did not embrace the style
of theism associated with de Maistre and the Jesuits. In rejecting the Mazzinian
(and Saint-Simonian) conception of progress, he had not thereby dissociated
knowledge and human advancement. He insisted, however, that genuine
progress could only emerge in a Catholic framework. Men could strive to
improve themselves and their world; but in applying their minds to specific
problems, they were actually participating in the infinite wisdom embodied in
the created world. Human and divine reason were thus not different in kind,
though the gulf between the two remained infinite.
Gioberti was clearly following a theologically precarious course. In
attempting to reconcile the church with the scientific tradition, he ran the risk
of antagonizing both reactionary and progressive opinion. His view of progress,
in particular, involved him in difficulties which he was never to resolve
satisfactorily. Though anxious to reassert the significance of a sound doctrinal
foundation, which only the church could guarantee, he set no limit to the range
of future possibilities. God in his infinite wisdom had created a world of infinite
scope, enabling human beings to extend and develop themselves in limitless
ways. In an important sense, God’s wisdom was in fact revealed through men’s
endeavours. Thus while Gioberti might want to sustain an analytical
distinction between divine and human wisdom, he nevertheless accepted that
the historical emergence of communities was itself a manifestation of God’s
design. God’s will was immanent in history; whether or not it should be
identified with history is a vexed question which troubled his contemporaries
and has continued to puzzle commentators to this day.#!
But it is not as a theologian that Gioberti warrants our attention. He had
never separated his activity as a theologian from his passionate commitment to
the national movement. And it was Gioberti the political propagandist who
was to capture the imagination of a generation. His shift in theological position
in the 1830s had been designed both to draw the church closer to liberal
"* See ibid., p. 5.
#! For analysis of the implications of the immanentist position see Bertrando Spaventa, Opere,
ed. Giovanni Gentile (3 vols., Florence, 1972), ii, pp. 575–604. For a perceptive discussion of the
bearing of Gioberti’s theology upon his politics see Giampietro Berti, ‘I moderati e il neoguelfismo’,
in Giovanni Cherubini et al., eds., Il movimento nazionale e il  (Milan, 1986), pp. 227–58,
especially pp. 233–8.
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opinion and to allay the political fears of an educated bourgeoisie which had
yet to flex its political muscles. The mobilization of the latter depended vitally
on severing any lingering connection between the national movement and
Jacobinism.
Revolution was still largely associated in the minds of educated Italians with
social and economic chaos and political terror. Indeed the church itself had
played a decisive role in converting the ideas of counter-revolutionary theorists
into a conventional wisdom.#" Developments in Europe in the 1830s, however,
especially in France, had considerably eroded the rigid ideological alliance
which had been forged in 1815. Catholic opinion, if not the church hierarchy,
had been drawn into the reform movement. In Italy Manzoni, Pellico, and the
contributors to Il Conciliatore and the Antologia had made distinctive Catholic
contributions to a debate which had been dominated in the revolutionary
period by the anti-clerical assumptions of the Enlightenment. What Gioberti
supplied was the crucial political dimension, enabling views formed in the
course of discussions of cultural and moral renewal, social, economic, and
educational reform to coalesce in a common programme.
II
Gioberti became a national celebrity with the publication of Del primato morale
e civile degli italiani in 1843. At a stroke he appeared to have isolated the
Mazzinians and reassured the church and the established ruling families of
Italy that all would not be lost in a properly founded Italian state. What he
provided was a distinctive reading of Italian history which focused on the
papacy as the quintessential national institution, the driving force behind the
great achievements of the past and a promise that Italy could yet aspire to
something rather more than the marginal role she had assumed in international
affairs in modern times. A generation which had relished the literary ferment
associated with Manzoni, Leopardi, and the wider romantic movement could
look with renewed confidence on a political expression of Italian identity,
secure in the knowledge that the right political choices could both restore the
lustre of Italy’s traditional institutions and make her once more a force to be
reckoned with in Europe. It was an argument which quieted the fears of the
politically timorous by treating recent Italian history as a deviation from the
indigenous pattern of development, attributable largely to foreign (and
especially French) influence. What was required in the circumstances which
prevailed in the 1840s was thus not new political adventures but a restoration
of institutions and practices which had proved their worth in better times.
Future progress depended crucially on a proper appreciation of the past.
Gioberti was at pains to root his argument in the familiar cultural experience
of his countrymen. He had struck precisely the tone that might attract broad
sections of the population to the national cause, avoiding the apocalyptic
#" See, for example, Cesare Balbo, Sommario della storia d ’Italia dalle origini fino ai nostri giorni, ed.
L. G. Tenconi (Milan, 1933), pp. 372–7.
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language of the more radical political sects while yet encouraging leaders to
seek to release the latent potential of the nation by ridding Italy of foreign rule.
It was a message which could not fail to appeal in general terms. What is
surprising, however, is that it should inaugurate a new phase in the
Risorgimento, encouraging even the most cautious and conservative liberals to
endorse the national movement.##
Gioberti’s success can be partly explained in terms of the modest nature of his
political aims. He had been intent upon disturbing the status quo as little as
possible, offering political proposals which might function as the lowest
common denominator of support for an Italian state. His advocacy of a
confederal solution to the Italian question should clearly be seen in these terms.
Proposals which are bland in themselves, however, can assume a quite different
dimension when viewed as the expression of a self-conscious movement.
Gioberti’s Primato had given the moderates a political identity.
Yet despite its instant appeal, the Primato remains a deeply ambiguous text.
Gioberti’s overriding concern had been to create a moderate consensus ; and
this involved him in omissions and emphases which puzzled his friends at the
time and have continued to puzzle commentators anxious to place the work in
the wider context of his developing ideas. In his anxiety not to antagonize
either the church or the Piedmontese monarchy, he had felt obliged to temper
earlier views. The Jesuits, for example, whom he had long held to be a major
constraint upon any rapprochement between the church and progressive opinion,
would find their civilizing role extolled.#$ While the Piedmontese monarchy,
notorious for its narrowly dynastic stance, would be lauded precisely for its
identification with the Italian cause.#%
Perhaps the most startling omission was the absence of any discussion of
reform in the Papal States. Social and economic conditions had degenerated to
such an extent during the pontificate of Gregory XVI that few could
understand how a leading liberal could put his faith in a papacy which had
studiedly ignored informed European opinion since 1831. Gioberti was himself
aware of the dilemma but insisted that prospects for reform within the church
and its territories would be maximized if the church could be persuaded to put
itself at the head of the national movement.#& What Gioberti stresses time and
again is the need to leave certain things unsaid in order to pursue his more
immediate strategic objectives. Rather than confront the church’s obvious
political and administrative deficiencies directly, he chose to emphasize instead
## See Cesare Balbo, ‘Vita di Cesare Balbo scritta da lui medesimo’, in ibid., p. 11. The immense
cultural impact of Manzoni should not be ignored in this context. Though he does not figure as a
political thinker of any standing, Manzoni had certainly accustomed educated Italians to think in
terms of a cultural and religious identity that had been disclosed historically. See Natalino
Sapegno, Ritratto di Manzoni e altri saggi (Bari, 1992), pp. 45–62.
#$ See Gioberti, Del primato morale e civile degli italiani, i, pp. 292–3.
#% See ibid., pp. 191–5.
#& See Gioberti’s letters to Mamiani dated 18 Dec. 1840 and 6 Apr. 1841 in Epistolario, ed. G.
Gentile, G. Balsamo-Crivelli, and M. Menghini (11 vols., Florence, 1927–37), iii, pp. 99–100, 181 ;
and the discussion in Giorgio Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia moderna (11 vols., Milan, 1956–86), ii,
pp. 360–71.
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the positive advantages which would accrue to a church set once more at the
centre of affairs. Similarly he hoped that his implicit criticism of the insular
policies of the Piedmontese would be the more effective if he could focus on the
potential impact upon the monarchy of a dominant national role.#'
Gioberti’s tactical dissimulation can easily mislead the unwary reader. But in
his own mind his style of argument was at one with his principal goal. Political
change in the 1830s had foundered because active groups had based utopian
ambitions on unrealistic foundations. The political world could not be made
anew to fit the dreams of the pure in heart. One had necessarily to begin with
the imperfect situation in which Italy found herself, building upon institutions
which could lend political and moral weight to proposals that might otherwise
get lost in a welter of good intentions. What an ideal Italian state might look
like was simply not a politically relevant issue in the fluid circumstances of the
1840s. If Gioberti’s text might be judged to be inconclusive or evasive from a
theoretical point of view, it should at least be seen as a fitting political
representation of the tactical realism he was so anxious to encourage.
It was Gioberti’s elevation of realism to the status of an article of faith that
enabled moderates who might not share his view of the special role of the
Catholic church to identify with his position. He insists that ‘no regime…can
easily establish itself, or, however established, can last, if it does not fit together
with and adapt itself to the special conditions of the nation to which it is
applied’.#( The point to stress is that, unlike in Mazzini’s treatment, the nation,
as a ‘natural ’ product of history, precedes the imposition of narrowly political
arrangements. The state, as a work of artifice, can be well or ill made. And the
wise statesman ignores at his peril the ‘natural ’ materials at his disposal.
Precipitate haste, for example, attempting ‘to destroy with violence’ the
unique conditions which distinguish a particular nation, is a recipe for disaster,
an undertaking ‘ for the most part impossible, and always horrible, execrable
and calamitous ’.#) Even Napoleon, acknowledged to be the political genius of
the age, had foundered because he had sought ‘ to refashion the political world
in a moment; but his edifice exploded and vanished in an instant like a
meteor’.#* The political lesson was clear. Lasting political change could only be
achieved within the tried channels of an established culture.
The central role which awaited the church in Gioberti’s scheme of things
was essentially a consequence of its place in the development of Italian culture.
Church and state had been so intertwined since Roman imperial days that ‘ the
desire to distinguish the interests and rights ’ of the one from the other was to
countenance an operation ‘repugnant to the nature of things ’.$! Indeed the
church hierarchy had penetrated every aspect of the institutional life of the
nation, leaving the nation only a residual identity outside the church. To strive
for a national Risorgimento outside and against the interests of the church
#' See Gioberti’s letter to Mamiani dated 13 Aug. 1843 in Epistolario, iv, pp. 304–7 ; reprinted
in Denis Mack Smith, ed., Il risorgimento italiano: storia e testi, pp. 113–15.
#( Gioberti, Del primato morale e civile degli italiani, i, p. 78. #) Ibid., p. 78.
#* Ibid., p. 419. $! Ibid., p. 80.
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would thus be to ignore the ‘natural limits ’ of Italian culture, denying the
nation the ‘ lustre ’ of its principal institution.$"
The details of Gioberti’s depiction of the role of the church through the
centuries need not detain us unduly. He sought to identify the church, both as
an institution and as a doctrinal fount, with flourishing periods in Italy’s past.
His reading of the medieval period, in particular, was very different from
Mazzini’s. Where Mazzini stressed the emergence of autonomous political life
at local levels in the communes, Gioberti focused instead on the crucial role of
the papacy. In the fierce controversies between empire and papacy, he sided
unambiguously with the latter. Whatever common life Italy enjoyed in the
centuries following the collapse of Rome derived from the church’s imposition
of patterns of conduct and shared beliefs. Though it had become fashionable
through the influence of Machiavelli, Sarpi, and Dante to portray the church
as an obstacle to national unity, the fact remained that the church alone had
saved a culture from the threat of disintegration and established a viable
foundation for further development. The Ghibellines, far from easing the
thraldom endured by Italian society at the hands of the church, had actually
introduced an extraneous element which rendered the identity of the society
precarious. Pagan principles of organization, coupled with a nominalist
philosophy that emphasized the subjective character of belief and experience,
reinforced precisely the centrifugal tendencies which the church had always
sought to counter. In the end, the church would be unable to secure its position,
suffering a doctrinal catastrophe in the Reformation which had far-reaching
implications for the nation as a whole. An event that had been welcomed by so
many in the name of freedom only served to deepen Italy’s dependence upon
foreign powers, undermining her special spiritual status without releasing
native talents and initiatives. Italy could progress in the future only through
recognition of her original source of strength. The Guelphs in earlier centuries
had championed a papal politics and a realist philosophy. And though much
had changed in the aftermath of the French Revolution, the need for an
objective civil and religious framework remained.
‘The Guelph idea is in itself just and sacred; and I regard it as the only reasonable
solution to the intricate and much canvassed problem of Italian national identity.
Philosophically it is the application of realism to the civil institutions of Italy ;
historically it is the only idea which is a fitting reflection of the original genius of the
nation and of its special conditions after the establishment of Christianity ; practically it
is the only idea which can be adopted without error and delirium.$#
But Gioberti was not simply arguing that the church, as a distinctive
national institution, should necessarily be taken into account in any political
plans for the future. Religion was crucial to any society, moulding attitudes and
dispositions and facilitating mutual understandings. In Italy’s case, however,
the church’s supranational position distinguished her as ‘ the religious nation
par excellence’.$$ Before the fragmentation of the respublica christiana Italy’s pre-
$" Ibid., p. 80. $# Ibid., p. 77. $$ Ibid., p. 32.
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eminence had been unchallenged. Rome, as the spiritual heart of Christian
Europe, could exercise an influence which bore no relation to the economic or
military power at her disposal. Not only could she function as a moral and
religious arbiter ; but her original role in the imposition of a specifically
Christian civilization had enabled her to dominate in political, legal and
administrative spheres long before the various states of Europe had assumed a
settled form.
Nor was Italian pre-eminence restricted to religion. Gioberti saw culture in
its broadest sense, embracing both the organized body of the arts and sciences
and the unspoken assumptions which inform judgements in daily life, as an
emanation from a specifically religious vision. And because religion could be
well or ill conceived, straying more or less from the truth, it followed that the
value of a cultural edifice would depend upon the viability of its foundations.
Since Gioberti equated Catholicism with the truth and Italy with Catholicism,
he automatically set Italy at the head of the nations. Her religious autonomy
made her an initiator where other nations were the receivers of the benefits of
civilization.$% While in speculative fields ranging from philosophy, through
mathematics and the physical sciences, to history, the fine arts, and literature,
her sound dogmatic base secured her an unrivalled position.$&
Much had changed, of course, with the Reformation. The integrity of the
Catholic world had been sullied by the proliferation of heretical sects. And the
apparent economic and political decline of Italy relative to France, England,
and Prussia made it the more difficult to identify Italian culture with all that
was best in the arts and sciences. Yet Europe as a whole, following the traumas
of revolution and reaction, could by no means be said to be either tranquil or
flourishing. French dominance had been associated with the dislocation and
expropriation of local economies. While Austria would not long be able to
sustain her defence of outmoded principles of organization and control. The
new world of emerging nations called for a different style of political leadership.
And Gioberti was convinced that Italy was perfectly placed to reclaim her
earlier prerogatives. Her religion still cast her as the ‘autonomous and
authoritative nation par excellence’ ; and because she had first given ‘the seeds
of civilization to the cultured nations of the modern world’, she could resume
her position because her original principles remained intact.$' Despite the
disappointments and humiliations of the last 300 years, Italian culture
remained essentially sound. If she could grasp her opportunity, not only would
she set her own political house in order but European leadership would beckon
once more.
Gioberti had sought to build his case around two quite separate con-
siderations. The first concerned the identification of the church as a central
pillar of Italian national consciousness, crucial to the conception Italians
formed of themselves but also involved in all aspects of lay adminstration; the
$% See ibid., pp. 53–60.
$& Gioberti develops his detailed case for Italian primacy in the arts and sciences at length in
ibid., ii, passim. $' Ibid., vol. i, p. 59.
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second, more speculatively, asserted that religion provided the creative
inspiration for all civilizations. Running the arguments together, Gioberti
could advance audacious claims for Italy’s past and future roles which could
satisfy both the pride of the church and the ambitions of secular nationalists.
With deceptive ease he could argue that since ‘ the religious primacy of Italy is
…undoubted, and because religion by its nature occupies the highest standing
in human affairs ’, it followed that religion should ‘confer upon the Italians a
dominant moral and civil position’.$( Whatever the merit of Gioberti’s
theoretical justification, there can be no doubting the rhetorical force of his
stratagem. He had exploited the thrust of anti-rationalist arguments without
endorsing the reactionary views which had been associated with such positions
since 1815. He hoped thereby that the suspicions and fears of groups which had
linked the reform movement with hostility to religion and tradition might have
been allayed, whilst at the same time nationalists would be encouraged to
broaden the basis of their appeal.
III
The argument from religious primacy could only advance Gioberti’s political
case so far. It would not, in itself, resolve sensitive questions about the kind of
political formation appropriate to Italian conditions, nor the sorts of tactics
which nationalists might best adopt. Many radicals, indeed, Mazzini included,
viewed the prospect of a resurgent papacy with some alarm, fearing the
extension of the blend of cultural despotism and inefficient administration
that had so signally marked the Papal States in recent years. At the very least,
however, Gioberti could claim that Italy’s distinctive religious tradition made
it inappropriate for her to seek political models beyond her own culture.
Cultural autonomy implied political autonomy. Gioberti makes the point
emphatically : ‘Italy contains within herself, principally through religion, all
the requisite conditions for her national and political Risorgimento. ’$) It
followed that whatever strategies she adopted to advance her political cause
should respect her principal cultural asset and particular identity, ruling out
both ‘ internal revolutions ’ and liberation by foreign arms.$*
Options for the future thus depended upon the configuration of forces within
a variegated national culture. A principle of unity had to be sought; but it had
to be ‘real, concrete, alive and solidly rooted’ in the culture, ‘not abstract and
in the air, because states govern themselves neither with chimeras nor
abstractions ’.%! Gioberti’s objection to the unitarists was precisely that their
views did ‘not emanate from a conception of the country, nor correspond to
particular Italian conditions, nor have a national foundation’ ; they were
rather ‘castles in the air ’ fashioned ‘ in imitation of foreign doctrines and
examples ’.%"
Gioberti was not claiming that a unitary state was everywhere and always
$( Ibid., p. 81. $) Ibid., p. 126. $* Ibid., p. 126. %! Ibid., p. 127.
%" Ibid., p. 134.
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inappropriate. He admitted, indeed, that in pure theory it had a pleasing, even
‘beautiful ’ aspect.%# What he could not allow, however, was that the merits of
particular forms of state should be considered in disregard of circumstances. He
insists that a ‘civil system is without practical value unless it is adapted to the
particular conditions of the time and place in which it is to be applied’.%$ Italy’s
centuries old divisions would simply not admit of rapid reduction to a single
centre of power without chronic dislocation which would undermine es-
tablished rights and interests. And since ‘ in politics a timely and applicable
good should be held to be the best ’, it followed that Italians should pursue a
polycentric system which would better reflect the imprint of their history.%%
The federal idea was not new to Italy. Gioberti traces its roots to the early
Etruscan confederations, finding recurring echoes in Pythagorean schemes of
hierarchical association, the Italic league and the Lombard leagues. Each of
the federal experiments, in fact, ‘having to be essentially both a totality and a
multiplicity ’, required ‘a unitary principle ’ which would not ‘annul the
variety’ of its constituent parts.%& In Italy such a principled focus had always
been available through religion and the clergy, where rule would be exercised
‘not through force of arms but through wisdom and conscience’, allowing the
various states and local centres to perform appropriate functions throughout
the peninsula.%' The idea of a papal-led Italian confederacy had been implicit
in the medieval period, especially under Gregory VII, without being
specifically associated with the national principle. The shifting priorities of
post-Napoleonic Europe, however, had made the fate of nations the urgent
political question of the day. By linking federalism, Catholicism, and
nationalism, Gioberti had exploited principal currents in Italian history,
urging a political innovation which could be said to be rooted in culture and
tradition.
The political form favoured by Gioberti was a self-conscious resurrection of
an original Guelph idea. Where the medieval papacy had sought to mobilize
an alliance of like-minded cities against the imperial ambitions of the
Ghibellines, Gioberti argued for a confederation of the established Italian
states, with the pope as symbolic figure-head, as a means towards the liberation
of Italy from foreign control and influence.%( It was an idea that had long
been mooted in the country, ‘perfectly fitted to the nature, customs, institutions
and geographical conditions of the peninsula’.%) Most important of all, it was
the simplest of schemes to put into practice. It could be adopted by the several
states with the least disturbance to their domestic arrangements, while holding
out the prospect of longer-term political, economic, and cultural improvements
which would be of benefit to all.
Gioberti is suggestive, but brief, in his treatment of detailed institutional
measures. He refers to federalism in a generic sense throughout the text but
insists that a more limited confederal framework is more appropriate to Italy.
The basic distinction between federalism and confederalism is drawn from
%# Ibid., p. 141. %$ Ibid., p. 141. %% Ibid., p. 141. %& Ibid., p. 143.
%' Ibid., p. 143. %( See ibid., pp. 145–6. %) Ibid., p. 142.
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Henry Wheaton’s Elements of international law (1836).%*Wheaton uses the term
confederalism to describe a system in which ‘the several states are connected
together by a compact which does not essentially differ from an ordinary treaty
of equal alliance’, leaving ‘the sovereignty of each member of the union…
unimpaired’.&! In this scheme of things, ‘ the resolutions of the federal body’ are
‘enforced, not as laws directly binding on the private individual subjects but
through the agency of each separate government, adopting them, and giving
them the force of law within its own jurisdiction’.&" In the case of federalism,
however,
the federal government created by the act of union is sovereign and supreme within the
sphere of the power granted to it by that act, and the sovereignty of each several state
is impaired both by the powers thus granted to the federal government, and the
limitations thus imposed on the several states’ governments.&#
Gioberti is clear that his own proposal, guaranteeing as it did the sovereignty
and independence of each constituent state, should, in Wheaton’s terms, be
classed as confederal.
On the specific division of institutional functions Gioberti offers no more
than hints. But he does light upon a principle which has assumed growing
significance in the recent history of federal theory. Jurisdictional disputes
between central and local authorities have always bedevilled the functioning of
federal systems, rendering the theoretical designation of clear areas of
competence all but impossible. Gioberti’s solution is deceptively simple. In
what might be taken to be an anticipation of the modern doctrine of
subsidiarity, he argues that ‘ the secret of hierarchical harmony lies in the
central power not expanding beyond spheres of common concern which regard
the state as a whole, while the particular affairs of its constituent parts be left
by the federative power in the hands of those directly involved’.&$ In the case
of Italy, where the central power would depend principally upon ‘moral
authority ’, the ‘ancient rights of each Italian sovereign regarding the internal
ordering of his state would be fully preserved’, leaving ‘affairs of common
interest ’ to be handled by an ‘assembly of the various princes ’.&%
Nor did Gioberti restrict his point to the peculiar functioning of federal
systems. In what is a clear allusion to the measure of administrative
decentralization which Mazzini incorporated in his own theory of the state,
Gioberti claimed that ‘ the concept of federation has a place in the theory of the
centralisti, though imperfectly and excessively subordinated to the predominant
unitary power; otherwise, instead of a government, one would have an
intolerable, even impossible, tyranny’.&& The contention, then, is that all
legitimate government must take into account in one fashion or another the
variety of local needs and circumstances. Federalism was distinctive precisely
because it elevated practical necessity to the status of an essential tenet of
%* Henry Wheaton, Elements of international law (2 vols., London, 1836).
&! Gioberti, Del primato morale e civile degli italiani, i, p. 482. &" Ibid., p. 482.
&# Ibid., p. 482. &$ Ibid., p. 149. &% Ibid., pp. 149–50. && Ibid., p. 147.
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theory, making federal government ‘ the best adapted to the pattern and
natural course of human society ’.&'
Gioberti’s analysis of the general advantages of a federal state is rather more
conventional. He sees the pooled strength of the Italian states as a safeguard
against both ‘domestic upheavals, wars and revolutions ’ and ‘ foreign
invasions ’.&( Effective control of her own confines would restore Italy to ‘ the
first rank among the powers ’, enabling her to make a significant contribution
to the organization of Europe as a whole.&) She could also make an impact
upon the wider world by resuming imperial expeditions, setting herself on the
same international footing as the other major powers.
On the domestic front, the abolition of differences in ‘weights, measures,
currencies, customs duties and language which miserably and narrowly divide
the various provinces and impede in a thousand ways the intellectual and
commercial dealings of the several members of the nation’ would signally
advance the economic, cultural, and social development of the nation,
gradually eroding ‘municipal divisions and rivalries ’.&* Mutual security, too,
would be reinforced through ‘reciprocal agreements ’, ensuring that the
‘extinction of the line of any prince’ would not be the occasion for a recurrence
of ‘barbarian invasions ’ and ‘execrable wars of succession’.'!
The prospect of enhanced security, indeed, was held out by Gioberti as a
principal incentive for established governments to flock to the confederal
standard. He saw his own age as a period of transition in which irresistible
pressures for change were building up. To refuse to alleviate at least some of
that pressure was to court problems in the future which might well prove to be
disastrous. The real lesson of the French revolutionary period, for Gioberti, was
that intransigent conservatism was as utopian as the dreams of the revolution-
aries. The ancien reUgime had crumbled and, despite efforts to turn the clock back
after 1815, a settled civil form had yet to emerge in Europe. Ordinary people,
however, had little interest in grandiose ideological schemes. What they sought
was a modest but tangible amelioration in their civil affairs, with a reasonable
assurance that further improvements would be forthcoming. They had been
driven into the arms of the revolutionaries only because ‘every other means of
obtaining civil reforms’ had been blocked.'" If rulers wanted to secure their
thrones, they thus had little alternative but to embrace the cause of reform. In
this perspective,Gioberti’s confederal schemehad obvious appeal.He promised
a major national reform which would nevertheless involve minimal insti-
tutional disruption in the several Italian states. More important still, future
reform could be managed by mutual agreement of established governments,
ensuring that civil reform did not degenerate into political revolution.
Gioberti was aware, of course, that the creation of a confederal Italian state
was much more than a narrowly domestic affair. An Italian nation-state of
whatever kind could only emerge at Austrian expense; while the collapse of
Austrian interests in Italy was likely to trigger a series of nationalist uprisings
&' Ibid., p. 146. &( Ibid., p. 139. &) Ibid., p. 139. &* Ibid., pp. 140–1.
'! Ibid., p. 141. '" Ibid., p. 211.
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elsewhere in the empire which might prove difficult to contain. Clearly Austria
had a great deal to lose in Italy both economically and politically. There could
be little doubt that she would defend her position with all the resources at her
disposal, including her formidable army. Gioberti nowhere explains precisely
how a papal-led confederacy could be expected to handle the diplomatic
implications of a war of liberation against a Catholic power. But he is aware
that military resources would have to come from somewhere. He envisages a
special role for Piedmont (‘ la provincia guerriera’), with her proud military
traditions.'# And, indeed, his confederacy of equal partners begins to look on
closer inspection like an axis built around Rome and Piedmont, the former ‘the
privileged seat of Christian wisdom’, the latter ‘ the principal base of Italian
military strength’.'$ Between the cultural hegemony of the church and the
military hegemony of Piedmont, other constituent states would probably find
little room for manoeuvre. But this, again, was an issue which Gioberti was
reluctant to press. He avoids discussion of the best means of striking a balance
between constitutional prerogatives and de facto power, largely in order to
make the prospect of an Italian confederation as attractive as possible to the
powers most likely to make it a success.
What principally emerges from a tangled text is the range of interests which
Gioberti had managed to accommodate. Established governments would have
little to fear from a confederal state, at least in the short term, and a great deal
to gain in terms of security. The church, arguably the leading ‘national ’
institution, would find itself once again occupying not only a central political
role nationally but also internationally. Piedmont could expect to secure a
dominant voice in the formulation of foreign policy, while at the same time
restraining the more ambitious schemes for domestic reform in the other
constituent states. Reformers, too, could see the creation of a national state as
a new beginning, advancing by degrees the sorts of piecemeal improvements
which had previously been blocked by foreign, municipal, and regional
interests. Only revolutionaries and reactionaries were excluded from the feast
Gioberti had prepared.
It may be that in seeking to maximize the political appeal of his text,
Gioberti had compromised unduly on certain crucial theoretical issues. The
vexed question of popular involvement, for example, which liberals tended to
welcome in theory but to avoid in practice, is barely mooted in the text. But
Gioberti is not alone among the liberals of his generation in evading this issue.
Like Mill and de Tocqueville, he feared the political impact of the untutored
masses. He never doubted, however, the educative role of a political life
conducted through regular institutions. In terms of preparation for politics,
there could be no substitute for practical engagement; but engagement had to
stem from gradual involvement which would not undermine the confidence of
established interests. In time, a ‘democratic ’ liberalism might be conceivable ;
without appropriate experience, however, such a venture would be the height
'# Ibid., p. 165. '$ Ibid., p. 177.
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of folly. In a real sense, the cause of progress had more to fear from its passionate
advocates than its reactionary opponents.
IV
Gioberti also felt the need almost immediately to clarify his position with
regard to the Jesuits.'% And certainly his own experience of the frustrations and
disappointments of government in the heady atmosphere of 1848 led him to
modify his views on both the appropriate form for an Italian state and the best
means of achieving it.'& But it was the Primato which had the decisive impact
upon political debate, providing a theoretical focus for a wide range of cautious
but forward-looking groups and interests. Italian moderates in the 1840s may
not have constituted a political party in the narrow sense but they now enjoyed
a collective identity which dramatically enhanced their capacity to initiate
policy and respond to developments.
It should not be supposed, however, that the moderates endorsed the detail
of Gioberti’s Primato. What his most discerning readers focused upon was not so
much the role of the papacy as that of Piedmont. Cesare Balbo (1789–1853), for
example, whose Catholic orthodoxy was never questioned, saw Piedmontese
military strength as the crucial factor in the Italian situation. While he could
accept the broad thrust of Gioberti’s defence of the role of Catholicism in the
development of Italian and European civilization, he could not envisage
significant political initiatives emanating from the papacy. Gioberti, it should
be stressed, privately accepted Balbo’s reservations. In a letter of 18 August
1843 he acknowledged that ‘ temporal government’ in the Papal States is ‘ the
worst and most disordered’ in Italy.'' But he felt that to admit as much openly
would undermine any prospect there might be of converting the church to the
national cause. Balbo, on the other hand, discounted papal leadership from the
outset. He was addressing the same liberal Catholic audience as Gioberti but
with a firmer grasp of the limitations of both the Papal States as currently
constituted and the wider international context.
Balbo’s Delle speranze d ’Italia (1844) must be seen, like Gioberti’s Primato, as
a self-conscious attempt to detach the national movement from Mazzinians
and sectarians.'( Balbo acknowledged that his own work would have been
inconceivable without the impetus of the Primato. In a letter to Gioberti he
describes the Primato as ‘a great book,…a major event in the history of Italian
literature and politics ’.') Delle speranze d ’Italia was, in fact, dedicated to
Gioberti and broke new ground principally on tactical and strategic questions.
Balbo was clear that Austrian domination of Lombardy and Venice should be
terminated. He recognized, however, that Austrian presence in Italy was an
'% See Vincenzo Gioberti, Prolegomeni del Primato morale e civile degli italiani (Lugano, 1846) ; and
Vincenzo Gioberti, Il gesuita moderno (5 vols., Lausanne, 1846–7).
'& See Vincenzo Gioberti, Il Rinnovamento civile d ’Italia, ed. Pier Angelo Menzio (Florence, 1925).
'' Gioberti, Epistolario, iv, p. 310.
'( Cesare Balbo, Delle speranze d ’Italia, ed. Achille Corbelli (Turin, 1948).
') See Candeloro, Storia dell ’Italia moderna, ii, p. 386.
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intrinsic dimension of the wider European balance of power. He rejected the
idea of an anti-Austrian confederation led by the papacy but shared Gioberti’s
fear of popular insurrections. It was unlikely that the other Italian states would
find Piedmontese domination acceptable ; nor was Piedmontese military
capacity sufficient to fashion a united Italy without help from abroad.
Fundamental political change in Italy, in Balbo’s view, would require a radical
readjustment of the European balance of power. His hope was that Austria
might be persuaded to accept losses in Italy in return for a strengthening of her
position in the Balkans. Fundamental changes in the Balkans were, in Balbo’s
view, inevitable, no matter what might happen in Italy. The Ottoman empire
was in long-term decline. The crucial question was simply how the political
vacuum might be filled. The European powers faced a stark choice between
Austrian or Russian domination of an area which had always been unstable.
Concerted European support for Austria seemed to Balbo to be the best means
of advancing the Italian cause, without running the risk of widespread popular
unrest.'* He certainly did not see the emergence of a nation-state in Italy as the
first in a series of national revolutions which would effectively undermine the
Austrian empire. Nor did he link national revolution in Italy with a major
challenge to the position of established elites.
Balbo’s detailed proposals need not detain us here. What is significant in the
context of this study, however, is the terms in which he defended a confederal
Italian state. He accepts the polycentric nature of Italian political culture as an
inescapable historical burden. It is simply the case that the great cities (he cites
Turin, Milan, Florence, Rome, Naples, Parma, and Modena, omitting,
somewhat surprisingly, Venice) are loci of political power.(! Any suggestion
that the citizens of such cities would willingly accept subordination by one
among them he regards as dangerously utopian; and subordination by force
would simply inflame entrenched antagonisms. To dream of a single capital for
a unitary state was thus both foolish and naive, running counter not only to
Italian history but to the general consensus in Europe that excessive
centralization was harmful to provincial interests.
Balbo thus endorsed Gioberti’s contention that ‘confederations are the
political form best adapted to the nature and history of Italy’.(" He took it as
self-evident that the cultures of northern and southern Italy, like the cultures of
northern and southern Europe, were so different that they would necessarily
require separate administrations to suit their various circumstances. The
example of the twelfth-century Lombard league had shown how independence
could be defended through confederation. The resurrection of the idea by
Gioberti, in the context of the delicate state of political debate within Italy,
constituted an event of national rather than simply literary or historical
significance.(#
What Gioberti and Balbo had exploited was the deep suspicion that all
moderates shared of expressions of discontent from the lower classes. Insur-
'* See Balbo, Delle speranze d ’Italia, pp. 108–10, 133–5. (! See ibid., p. 25.
(" Ibid., p. 34. (# See ibid., p. 37.
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rections which depended upon fomenting popular unrest were intrinsically
unstable. They ran the risk of sparking off a concatenation of uprisings which
could elicit an authoritarian response from both domestic and international
authorities. The moderates had recognized, as Mazzini had not, that political
change in Italy could not be isolated from wider international considerations.
The princes of Italy might be persuaded to pursue a concerted campaign
against Austria. If the principal impetus for change were seen to come from
Mazzinians and other revolutionary sectarians, the more probable outcome
was that the princes would themselves seek the assistance of Austria in defence
of the status quo.
Federalism or confederalism thus figured in moderate thinking as a lowest
common political denominator rather than as a principle. Gioberti and Balbo
had given the idea political credibility. Thenceforth it could be invoked
without being argued for, at least until the major reassessment of strategy
provoked by the failure of the 1848 revolutions. Even where the specific neo-
Guelph reading of Italian history was rejected, the political implication was left
suspended.
The real novelty in moderate political discourse in the middle years of the
1840s is the urgency of tone. A seemingly unbridgeable gulf had emerged
between revolutionaries and sectarians on the one side and various species of
(often theologically buttressed) reactionary and absolutist on the other. Left to
itself, the situation showed every sign of degenerating. A revolutionary
cataclysm on the scale of 1789 could not be discounted. Upheaval on that scale
would threaten the limited political progress made in Italy and Europe. The
moderates as a group were aware that they could be swamped. It thus behoved
them to maximize the impact of the very considerable political advantages they
currently enjoyed. Gioberti and Balbo had provided them with the outlines of
an historically informed political theory and strategy. What they now needed
was a programme.
